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EVOLUTIONARY GAMES ON GRAPHS
AND DISCRETE DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS
JEREMIAS EPPERLEIN, STEFAN SIEGMUND, AND PETR STEHLI´K
Abstract. Evolutionary games on graphs play an important role in the study of evo-
lution of cooperation in applied biology. Using rigorous mathematical concepts from a
dynamical systems and graph theoretical point of view, we formalize the notions of at-
tractor, update rules and update orders. We prove results on attractors for different utility
functions and update orders. For complete graphs we characterize attractors for synchro-
nous and sequential update rules. In other cases (for k-regular graphs or for different
update orders) we provide sufficient conditions for attractivity of full cooperation and full
defection. We construct examples to show that these conditions are not necessary. Fi-
nally, by formulating a list of open questions we emphasize the advantages of our rigorous
approach.
Keywords: evolutionary games on graphs; discrete dynamical systems; nonautonomous
dynamical systems; attractors; cycles; cooperation; game theory; defection
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1. Introduction
Game theory was developed in the 1940s as a mathematical tool to study interactions
and decisions of rational agents [24]. For a long time it was mainly applied in economics
(see e.g. [8, 23] and the references therein). In the 1970s, it was introduced to biology
via the concept of biological fitness and natural selection [21] and the evolutionary game
theory enabled to study infinite homogeneous populations via replicator equations [13, 14].
Recently, dynamics in populations which are finite and spatially structured (the structure
being represented by graphs) attracted a lot of attention [26, 29]. Evolutionary game
theory on graphs has shown that the rate of cooperation strongly depends on the structure
of the underlying interaction graph (see e.g. [11, 19, 26, 27, 28, 29] and numerous following
papers). At the same time, the similar problem of equilibria selection in cooperation games
via timing structures has attracted a lot of attention, both in microeconomics (e.g. [15, 16]),
as well as in macroeconomics (e.g. [17, 18]).
Mathematically, evolutionary games on graphs are very complex structures which bring
together notions from graph theory, game theory, dynamical systems and stochastic pro-
cesses. Mathematical techniques which are used are therefore complex and include complex
approximative techniques like pair and diffusion approximation and voter model perturba-
tions [1, 4, 5] or are limited to special classes of graphs, e.g., cycles [27], stars [3, 10] and
vertex-transitive graphs [2, 6]. Whereas these papers focus mainly on stochastic updating
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of vertices, the goal of this paper is to study evolutionary games on graphs with various
deterministic update rules in the framework of discrete dynamical systems and formalize
the notions of (autonomous and nonautonomous) evolutionary games on graphs, attrac-
tors, update rules and update orders. Being aware that this approach may look too formal
for some, we believe that this approach should help to (i) disclose and answer interesting
questions (some of them listed in Section 9), (ii) understand patterns by means of simple
examples and counterexamples, (iii) describe analytically dynamics on small graphs (mo-
tivated e.g. by small sizes of agents in cooperation games in macroeconomics [18]) and (iv)
bridge a gap between three seemingly separate mathematical areas: graph theory, game
theory and dynamical systems.
In Section 2, we introduce, for a given graph and an arbitrary utility function, a new
formal notion of an (autonomous) evolutionary game on a graph (Definition 3) and at-
tractors (Definition 5). In our rigorous approach, we are trying to follow the spirit of
[11, 19, 27, 28] and [29]. In Section 3 we introduce two basic utility functions and relate
them to the underlying game-theoretical parameters. In Section 4 we characterize the
attractivity of full defection (Theorem 9) and full cooperation (Theorem 10) on complete
graphs. On k-regular graphs we provide only a sufficient condition for attractivity of these
states (Theorem 12) and show (in Example 13) that it is not necessary. Section 5 is devoted
to the extension of the notion of an evolutionary game on a graph to the realistic situation
that the vertices are not all updated at each time step (Definition 14). The new notion
of nonautonomous evolutionary game on a graph (Definition 18) has the structure of a
general nonautonomous dynamical system (Definition 17). We also introduce attractors
and their basins for nonautonomous evolutionary games (Definitions 20 and 21) and relate
them to the autonomous case (Remark 23). In Section 6 we provide conditions for attrac-
tivity of full defection and full cooperation of nonautonomous evolutionary games. The
conditions are sufficient for non-omitting update orders but also necessary if a sequential
update order is considered (Theorem 24). Example 25 shows that in general the condi-
tions are not necessary. In Section 7 we provide a complete characterization of attractors
of evolutionary games on complete graphs for synchronous (Theorem 26) and sequential
(Theorem 27) update orders. In particular, Theorem 27(c) (together with Example 29)
shows the existence of an attractive cycle. In Section 8 we discuss the role of different
utility functions on irregular graphs. Finally, Section 9 is devoted to concluding remarks
and open questions.
2. Evolutionary games on graphs
We recall some basic definitions from graph theory, see e.g. [9]. A graph G = (V,E) is a
pair consisting of a set of vertices V and a set of edges E ⊆ {e ⊆ V : |e| = 2}. Let Nk(i)
denote the k-neighbourhood of vertex i ∈ V , i.e. all vertices with the distance exactly k
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from i. Furthermore, let us define
N≤k(i) =
k⋃
j=0
Nj(i).
We utilize basic concepts from dynamical systems theory (see e.g. [7]).
Definition 1. Taking into account that our state space is discrete, we strip off any topo-
logical properties and call a map
ϕ : N0 ×X → X
on an arbitrary set X a dynamical system with discrete one-sided time N0, if it satisfies
the semigroup property
ϕ(0, x) = x and ϕ(t, ϕ(s, x)) = ϕ(t+ s, x) for all t, s ∈ N0, x ∈ X.
The set X is called the state space and ϕ(·) = ϕ(1, ·) : X → X the corresponding time-1-
map.
Any map ϕ : X → X is the time-1-map of an induced dynamical system with discrete
one-sided time N0 which is defined via composition or iteration as follows
N0 ×X → X, (t, x) 7→ ϕt(x),
where ϕ0 = id and ϕt = ϕ ◦ · · · ◦ ϕ. In this paper we describe dynamical systems via their
time-1-map.
We will define evolutionary games on graphs as special dynamical systems with the property
that a vertex follows a strategy in its 1-neighbourhood which currently yields the highest
utility. To prepare this definition we introduce for a “function on a graph” the size of the
neighbourhood on which its values depend.
Definition 2. Let M,S be arbitrary sets and G = (V,E) a graph. We say that a function
f : SV → MV has a dependency radius r ∈ N0 on G if all values fi(x) of a component fi
of f depend on a component xj of the argument x = (x1, . . . , x|V |) only if the vertex j ∈ V
is in the r-neighbourhood of the vertex i ∈ V , i.e. if for each x, y ∈ SV and i, j ∈ V the
following implication holds:
〈∀k ∈ V \ {j} : xk = yk〉 and 〈fi(x) 6= fi(y)〉 ⇒ j ∈ N≤r(i).
We are now in a position to formulate evolutionary games on graphs with unconditional
imitation update rule as a dynamical system. This update rule goes back to [26] and is also
called “imitate-the-best”. The basic idea is that at each time step every player determines
his utility based on his strategy and the strategies of his neighbours. Based on that, each
player adopts the strategy of his neighbour with the highest utility (if it is greater than his
own).
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Definition 3. Let S be an arbitrary set. An evolutionary game on G = (V,E) consists of
the following two ingredients:
(i) a utility function on G = (V,E), i.e. a function u : SV → RV which has dependency
radius 1 on G,
(ii) the dynamical system ϕ : SV → SV with ϕi := proji ◦ ϕ : SV → S given by
(1) ϕi(x) =
{
xmax if |Ai(x)| = 1 and Ai(x) = {xmax},
xi if |Ai(x)| > 1,
where the set Ai(x) is defined by
(2) Ai(x) = {xk : k ∈ argmax {uj(x) : j ∈ N≤1(i)}} .
Remark 4. (i) Typically, S represents the set of strategies (e.g., C and D) and the vector
x = (x1, . . . , x|V |) ∈ SV the population state (i.e., the spatial distribution of strategies at
a given time).
(ii) The cardinality of Ai(x) in (1) is used to ensure that all vertices with the highest
utility have the same state. If that is not the case, the vertex preserves its current state.
Obviously, this may not be a reasonable approach once the set of strategies S contains more
than two strategies and the current state may yield worse payoff than all other strategies.
(iii) An evolutionary game ϕ on G has dependency radius 2 on G.
(iv) Whereas the notion of evolutionary games in biological applications (see e.g. [27])
sometimes has a probabilistic aspect, our Definition 3 of an evolutionary game is deter-
ministic. Note that, although we do not follow that direction in this paper, in principle it
is possible to extend Definition 3 to also incorporate that a vertex follows strategies in its
1-neighbourhood with a certain probability.
(v) Given the fact, that each vertex mimics the state of its neighbour with the highest
utility, we speak about imitation dynamics. Preserving the deterministic nature, there are
various possibilities of defining the dynamics. For example, instead of imitation dynamics
ϕI := ϕ in (1), we could consider deterministic death-birth dynamics, in which only the
vertices with the lowest utility adopt the state of its neighbour with highest utility, i.e.
ϕDBi (x) =
xmax if ui(x) = minj∈V uj(x), |Ai(x)| = 1 and Ai(x) = {xmax},xi if ui(x) > min
j∈V
uj(x) or |Ai(x)| > 1.
Alternatively, we could consider deterministic birth-death dynamics in which only vertices
in the neighbourhood of vertices with the highest utility are updated, i.e.
ϕBDi (x) =
xmax if |Ai(x)| = 1, maxj∈N1(i)uj(x) = maxj∈V uj(x) and Ai(x) = {xmax},xi if |Ai(x)| > 1 or max
j∈N1(i)
uj(x) < max
j∈V
uj(x).
We leave the analysis of such dynamical systems for further research and focus on evolu-
tionary games with imitation dynamics (1).
EVOLUTIONARY GAMES ON GRAPHS AND DISCRETE DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS 5
We define a notion of distance d in the state space SV by d : SV ×SV → R with S ⊂ R by
d(x, y) := |{i ∈ V : xi 6= yi}| .
Similarly, the distance of a state x ∈ SV from a set of states B ⊂ SV will be denoted by
dist : SV × 2SV → R and defined by
dist(x,B) := inf {d(x, y) : y ∈ B} .
Definition 5. Let ϕ : SV → SV be an evolutionary game on G = (V,E) and A ⊂ SV
invariant under ϕ, i.e. ϕ(A) = A. Then A 6= ∅ is called attractor of ϕ if for any x ∈ SV
with dist(x,A) ≤ 1 there exists t ≥ 0 such that ϕt(x) ∈ A.
If A = SV , we say that A is the trivial attractor, otherwise A is said to be a nontrivial
attractor.
Remark 6. If S and V are finite sets, then d generates the discrete topology on SV . With
this topology an invariant set A is an attractor if and only if lim
t→∞
dist (ϕt(x), A) = 0 for all
x ∈ SV with dist(x,A) ≤ 1.
3. Utility Function and Cooperative Games
We discuss cooperative evolutionary games (see e.g. [25]) with utilities which are implied by
a static game (see e.g. [8] for an introduction to game theory) on a state space S = {C,D}
consisting of two strategies, each vertex can either cooperate (C) or defect (D).
C D
C a b
D c d
Consequently, a player gets a if both he and his partner cooperate, he gets b if he coop-
erates and his partner defects, if he defects and his partner cooperates he gets c, if both
players defect, he gets d. We focus on cooperation games and therefore make the following
assumptions on the parameters a, b, c, d:
(A1) For the sake of brevity, we assume that no two parameters are equal.
(A2) It is always better if both players cooperate than if they both defect, i.e. a > d.
(A3) If only one cooperates, it is more advantageous to be the defector, i.e. c > b.
(A4) No matter what strategy a player chooses, it is always better for him if his opponent
cooperates, i.e. a > b and c > d.
(A5) a, c are positive, i.e. there is a positive reward for cooperation.
Definition 7. We say that a parameter vector (a, b, c, d) is admissible if it satisfies assump-
tions (A1)-(A5). The set P ⊂ R4 of all such quadruplets is called the set of admissible
parameters.
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The set P of admissible parameters splits into four regions corresponding to scenarios
which we call Full cooperation, Hawk and dove, Stag hunt1 and Prisoner’s dilemma:
PFC = {(a, b, c, d) ∈ R4 : a > c > b > d},
PHD = {(a, b, c, d) ∈ R4 : c > a > b > d},
PSH = {(a, b, c, d) ∈ R4 : a > c > d > b},
PPD = {(a, b, c, d) ∈ R4 : c > a > d > b}.
Obviously,
(3) P = PFC ∪ PHD ∪ PSH ∪ PPD.
In the case of static games, a (mixed) Nash equilibirum for two player games is a pair of
mixed strategies (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) such that
u1(σ
∗
1, σ
∗
2) ≥ (σ1, σ∗2), for all σ1 ∈ Σ1,
u2(σ
∗
1, σ
∗
2) ≥ (σ∗1, σ2), for all σ2 ∈ Σ2,
where Σi denotes the set of all mixed strategies of player i (see [8] for more details). In the
admissible regions the Nash equilibria have the following structure.
abbr. scenario Nash equilibria
a > c > b > d FC Full cooperation (C,C)
c > a > b > d HD Hawk & Dove (C,D), (D,C) and a mixed equilibrium
a > c > d > b SH Stag hunt (C,C), (D,D) and a mixed equilibrium
c > a > d > b PD Prisoner’s dilemma (D,D)
Note that the mixed Nash equilibirum d−b
(a−c)+(d−b) provides the minimal payoff in the SH
game and the maximal payoff in the HD game. As we will see, this fact influences the
stability of corresponding interior points of, e.g., replicator dynamics, see [14].
There are two natural ways how to define utilities on evolutionary graphs with S = {0, 1}
(the state 1 corresponds to C and the state 0 to D). We could either consider the aggregate
utility
(4) uAi (t) = a
∑
j∈N1(i)
sisj + b
∑
j∈N1(i)
si(1− sj) + c
∑
j∈N1(i)
(1− si)sj + d
∑
j∈N1(i)
(1− si)(1− sj),
or the mean utility
(5) uMi (t) =
1
|N1(i)|u
A
i (t).
Note, that on regular graphs |N1(i)| is constant and both utilities yield the same evolu-
tionary games. However, on irregular graphs, this is no longer true (see Section 8) and one
could argue which utility is more realistic.
1Strictly speaking, the Stag hunt scenario is usually considered with a > d > c > b, we use this notation,
since the equilibria share the same structure.
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Figure 1. Set of admissible parameters and four game-theoretic scenarios,
a = 1 and d = 0.
Remark 8. Once we consider the mean utility function (or the aggregate utility function
on regular graphs) we could, without loss of generality, normalize parameters a, b, c, d so
that a˜ = 1 and d˜ = 0 by the following map
x˜ =
x− d
a− d , x = a, b, c, d.
Conversely, given normalized values of parameters a˜, b˜, c˜, d˜, we could for arbitrary a and d
such that a > d construct non-normalized values of parameters by
x = d+ (a− d)x˜, x = a, b, c, d.
This allows us to simplify conditions or plot regions corresponding to various scenarios, cf.
Figure 1 where four scenarios are depicted.
4. Evolutionary Games on Kn
In this section we consider evolutionary games generated by the simplest graphs – complete
graphs Kn and regular graphs. Note that evolutionary games on Kn correspond to dynam-
ics of a well-mixed (nonspatial) population. We focus on the attractivity of full defection
(0, 0, . . . , 0) and full cooperation (1, 1, . . . , 1) and its connection to parameters a, b, c, d.
Theorem 9. For all admissible (a, b, c, d) ∈ P the following two statements are equivalent:
(a) {(0, 0, . . . , 0)} is an attractor of the evolutionary game ϕ on Kn with the utility function
(4).
8 JEREMIAS EPPERLEIN, STEFAN SIEGMUND, AND PETR STEHLI´K
(b) (a, b, c, d) ∈ P satisfy
(6) b < d or n < 1 +
c− d
b− d.
Proof. Choose x ∈ SV = {0, 1}V such that d (x, (0, 0, . . . , 0)) = 1. Then there exists a
unique i ∈ V such that xi = 1 and xj = 0 for all j 6= i (i.e. i is the unique cooperator).
Consequently, the utilities are:
ui(x) = (n− 1)b,
uj(x) = c+ (n− 2)d.
(b)⇒ (a) The inequalities (6) imply that
ui(x)− uj(x) = (n− 1)b− c− (n− 2)d = n(b− d)− (b− d)− (c− d) < 0.
Therefore, uj(x) > ui(x) for all j 6= i. Hence, ϕj(x) = 0 for all j ∈ V and ϕ(x) =
(0, 0, . . . , 0).
(a)⇒ (b) Assume that (6) does not hold, i.e.2
b > d and n ≥ 1 + c− d
b− d.
If n = 1 + c−d
b−d , then ui(x) = uj(x). This implies that ϕj(x) = xj and ϕ(x) = x. If
n > 1+ c−d
b−d , then ui(x) > uj(x). This implies that ϕj(x) = 1 and ϕ(x) = (1, 1, . . . , 1), which
implies that (0, 0, . . . , 0) cannot be reached from x, since ϕ((1, 1, . . . , 1)) = (1, 1, . . . , 1). 
A similar result could be obtained for the full cooperation state (1, 1, . . . , 1).
Theorem 10. For all admissible (a, b, c, d) ∈ P the following two statements are equivalent:
(a) {(1, 1, . . . , 1)} is an attractor of the evolutionary game ϕ on Kn with the utility function
(4).
(b) (a, b, c, d) ∈ P satisfy
(7) a > c and n > 1 +
a− b
a− c.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 9.
(b) ⇒ (a) Choose x ∈ SV = {0, 1}V such that d (x, (1, 1, . . . , 1)) = 1. Then there exists
a unique i ∈ V such that xi = 0 and xj = 1 for all j 6= i (i.e. i is the unique defector).
Consequently, the utilities are:
ui(x) = (n− 1)c,
uj(x) = b+ (n− 2)a.
2Note, that b = d is not admissible.
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Figure 2. Attractivity regions of (0, 0, . . . , 0) (light gray) and (1, 1, . . . , 1)
(horizontally hatched) (a = 1 and d = 0 are fixed, cf. Remark 8). (a) n = 3
on the left and (b) n = 5 on the right.
Then (7) implies that
ui(x)− uj(x) = (n− 1)c− b− (n− 2)a = −n(a− c) + (a− c) + (a− b) < 0.
Therefore, uj(x) > ui(x) for all j 6= i. Hence, ϕj(x) = 1 for all j ∈ V and ϕ(x) =
(1, 1, . . . , 1).
(a)⇒ (b) Assume that (7) does not hold, i.e.
a < c or n ≤ 1 + a− b
a− c.
If the equality n = 1 + a−b
a−c holds, then ϕ(x) = x. Otherwise, ϕ(x) = (0, 0, . . . , 0). Conse-
quently, (1, 1, . . . , 1) is not attractive. 
Remark 11. Theorems 9 and 10 show that attractivity of full defection and full cooper-
ation is qualitatively different for admissible parameters in the four different regions FC,
HD, SH, PD in (3). In the PD case, there is no dependence on n and the values of the
parameters. On the other hand, in the other cases different behaviour could occur for dif-
ferent parameter values and in dependence of the size of the graph n. Evidently, the richest
situation occurs in the FC case in which it is possible that, depending on the parameter,
full defection and full cooperation, as well as none of them, or both of them together are
attractive, cf. Table 1 and Figure 2.
We observe that in the PD case, (0, 0, . . . , 0) is always attractive. Similarly, in the FC case
(1, 1, . . . , 1) is the unique attractor if and only if n > 1 + max
{
c−d
b−d ,
a−b
a−c
}
.
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PD HD SH FC
(0, 0, . . . , 0) attractive always n < 1 + c−d
b−d always n < 1 +
c−d
b−d
(1, 1, . . . , 1) attractive never never n > 1 + a−b
a−c n > 1 +
a−b
a−c
Table 1. Kn - Connection between graph size, different scenarios and at-
tractivity of states (0, 0, . . . , 0) and (1, 1, . . . , 1)
.
Finally, note that the results are consistent with those for infinite populations studied in
the evolutionary game theory [14, 25], in which the full cooperation is ESS if and only if
a > c and the full defection is ESS if and only if b < d (those inequalities are obtained
as n → ∞). Note that for finite complete graphs additional conditions involving the size
n are involved (see (6)-(7)). Thus, the parameter region in finite populations is larger for
full defection and smaller for full cooperation, see Figure 2.
The ideas from the proofs of Theorems 9 and 10 easily carry over to k-regular graphs.
Theorem 12. Let (a, b, c, d) ∈ P be admissible and G be a k-regular graph, k ≥ 2. Then:
(a) If
(8) k(b− d) < c− d,
holds, then {(0, 0, . . . , 0)} is an attractor of the evolutionary game ϕ on G with the
utility function (4).
(b) If
(9) k(a− c) > a− b,
holds, then {(1, 1, . . . , 1)} is an attractor of the evolutionary game ϕ on G with the
utility function (4).
However, the following example shows that (8) and (9) are only sufficient and not necessary
for the attractivity of {(0, 0, . . . , 0)} and {(1, 1, . . . , 1)} for evolutionary games on k-regular
graphs.
Example 13. Consider the undirected Cayley graph (see [9, p. 34]) of the Dihedral group
of order 24 (as a permutation group on {1, . . . , 12}, see [12, p. 46] for the notation) with
generators
g1 = (2 12)(3 11)(4 10)(5 9)(6 8),
g2 = (1 2)(3 12)(4 11)(5 10)(6 9)(7 8),
g3 = (1 4)(2 3)(5 12)(6 11)(7 10)(8 9).
The graph is depicted in Figure 3. Consider the evolutionary game on G with utility
function (4) and parameters (a, b, c, d) = (1, 0.88, 1.74, 0). Then the following inequalities
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0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
8 9 10
Figure 3. A trajectory of the evolutionary game from Example 13. For
possible reproduction we provide its graph6 notation (see [22]):
WsOPA?OG?[?E@C?o@??@??O?????????s??k?@@_?Cg??KO.
are fulfilled:
0 · c+ 3 · d = 0 < 1 · c+ 2 · d = 1.74 < 0 · a+ 3 · b = 2.64
< 1 · a+ 2 · b = 2.76 < 2 · a+ 1 · b = 2.88 < 3 · a+ 0 · b = 3
< 2 · c+ 1 · d = 3.48 < 3 · c+ 0 · d = 5.22
Since G is 3-regular, all other parameters that satisfy the same inequalities will lead to the
same evolutionary game.
The initial state with exactly one cooperator, whose position does not matter because
the graph is vertex-transitive, reaches (0, 0, . . . , 0) after 10 steps for these parameters (see
Figure 3). Therefore (0, 0, . . . , 0) is attractive, although (8) is violated.
5. General Asynchronous Update - Nonautonomous Evolutionary Games
In an evolutionary game all nodes are updated in a synchronous way (i.e. all nodes at each
time step), cf. Definition 3. To formulate asynchronous update which is only updating a
certain subset of nodes at each time step, we introduce a notion of update order.
Definition 14. A set-valued function T : N0 → 2V is called update order.
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The update order T is called
• non-omitting, if for each vertex v ∈ V and each t0 ∈ N0, there exists t > t0 such
that v ∈ T (t); otherwise T is called omitting,
• periodic, if there exists T ∈ N such that T (t+ T ) = T (t) for each t ∈ N0,
• synchronous, if T (t) = V for each t ∈ N0; otherwise T is called asynchronous,
• sequential, if vertices can be ordered so that T (t) = {(t+ 1)(modn)}.
Remark 15. Obviously, synchronous and sequential update orders are automatically non-
omitting and periodic. A periodic update order could be omitting and a non-omitting
update order is not necessarily periodic.
Example 16. Let G be a finite graph with V = {1, 2, . . . , n}, for some n ∈ N, n ≥ 3.
Then T : N0 → 2V given by
(10) T (t) =
{
{1, 2} if t is even,
{3, 4, . . . , n} if t is odd,
is a periodic and non-omitting update order.
Let us define
(N0)2≥ := {(t, s) ∈ N0 × N0 : t ≥ s} .
Definition 17. A nonautonomous dynamical system (or two-parameter process, or two-
parameter semiflow) ϕ is a map
ϕ : (N0)2≥ ×M →M,
which satisfies the two-parameter semiflow property
ϕ(t, t, x) = x, ϕ(t, r, ϕ(r, s, x)) = ϕ(t, s, x),
for all x ∈M and t, r, s ∈ N0 such that t ≥ r ≥ s.
Definition 18. A nonautonomous evolutionary game on G = (V,E) with a utility function
u and update order T : N0 → 2V is the nonautonomous dynamical system ϕ : (N0)2≥×SV →
SV with ϕi := proji ◦ ϕ : (N0)2≥ × SV → S defined by
ϕi(t+ 1, t, x) =
{
xmax if i ∈ T (t), |Ai(x)| = 1 and Ai(x) = {xmax},
xi otherwise,
where Ai(x) is defined in (2).
Remark 19. Definition 18 is a nonautonomous version of an evolutionary game with
imitation dynamics (cf. Remark 4). As in the case of (autonomous) evolutionary games, we
could consider alternative definitions of deterministic nonautonomous evolutionary games.
Definition 20. Let ϕ : (N0)2≥ × SV → SV be a nonautonomous evolutionary game on
G = (V,E). A set A ⊂ N0 × SV is called attractor of ϕ if
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(a) A is invariant, i.e. for all (t, t0) ∈ (N0)2≥:
ϕ(t, t0, A(t0)) = A(t)
where A(t) := {x ∈ SV : (t, x) ∈ A}.
(b) A is attracting, i.e. for any (t0, x) ∈ N0 × SV with dist(x,A(t0)) ≤ 1 we have
lim
t→∞
dist (ϕ(t, t0, x), A(t)) = 0.
Definition 21. The basin of attraction of an invariant set A ⊂ N0 × SV is the set
B(A) :=
{
(s, x) ∈ N0 × SV : lim
t→∞
dist (ϕ(t, s, x), A(t)) = 0
}
.
We can make the following simple observation.
Remark 22. Let ϕ be a nonautonomous evolutionary game and A ⊂ N0 × SV be an
invariant set such that A(t) = A(s) for all t, s ∈ N0. If we define
D1(A) :=
{
(t, x) ∈ N0 × SV : dist(x,A(t)) = 1
}
,
then A is an attractor of a nonautonomous evolutionary game ϕ : (N0)2≥×SV → SV if and
only if D1(A) ⊂ B(A).
Remark 23. A nonautonomous evolutionary game ϕ : (N0)2≥×SV → SV with synchronous
update order T (t) = V induces an associated (autonomous) evolutionary game ψ : SV →
SV by setting
(11) ψ(x) := ϕ(t+ 1, t, x) for all x ∈ SV ,
for an arbitrary t ∈ N0. ψ in (11) is well-defined because synchronous update order implies
that ϕ(t+ 1, t, x) = ϕ(s+ 1, s, x) for all t, s ∈ N0 and x ∈ SV .
An attractor A ⊂ N0×SV of ϕ which is time-independent (i.e. A(t) = A(s) for all t, s ∈ N0)
induces an attractor C := A(t) of ψ, because limt→∞ dist (ϕ(t, t0, x), A(t)) = 0, together
with the fact that ϕ(t, t0, x) = ψ
t−t0(x), implies that
lim
t→∞
dist(ψt−t0(x), C) = 0.
In this situation the domain of attraction B(A) and the set D1(A) from Remark 22 are
also time-independent and we identify them with the sets {x ∈ SV : (0, x) ∈ B(A)} and
{x ∈ SV : (0, x) ∈ D1(A)}. In general, an attractor A of a nonautonomous evolutionary
game ϕ can be time-dependent, e.g. if A is a periodic orbit A(t + p) = A(t) for all t ∈ N0
and some natural number p ≥ 2, which is attractive. If A ⊂ N0×SV is a time-independent
attractor then we say that A(0) ⊂ SV is an attractor. If, moreover, A = N0×{x} then we
say that x is an attractor.
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6. Nonautonomous Evolutionary Games on Kn
We follow the ideas from Section 4 and study the attractivity of full cooperation (1, 1, . . . , 1)
and full defection (0, 0, . . . , 0) on complete graphs for nonautonomous evolutionary games
with the utility function (4).
Theorem 24. Let ϕ be a nonautonomous evolutionary game on Kn with the aggregate
utility function (4), (a, b, c, d) ∈ P and T : N0 → 2V be a non-omitting update order.
Then,
(i) if (6) holds, then (0, 0, . . . , 0) is an attractor of ϕ,
(ii) if (7) holds, then (1, 1, . . . , 1) is an attractor of ϕ.
Moreover, if T is sequential, then the reverse implications also hold.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the ideas from the proofs of Theorems 9 and 10. To
prove statement (i), let us assume that (6) holds and x ∈ SV = {0, 1}V is such that
d (x, (0, 0, . . . , 0)) = 1. Then there exists a unique i ∈ V such that xi = 1 and xj = 0 for all
j 6= i. The utilities satisfy uj(x) > ui(x) for all j 6= i. Hence, ϕ(t + 1, t, x) = x if i /∈ T (t)
and ϕ(t+1, t, x) = (0, 0, . . . , 0) if i ∈ T (t). Since the update rule is non-omitting, we know
that there exists t ∈ N0 such that i ∈ T (t) and consequently for each s ∈ N we have
ϕ(t+ s, 0, x) = (0, 0, . . . , 0).
The latter statement (ii) is proven in the same way.
Finally, we would like to show that if the update order is sequential, then the conditions
(6) and (7) are also necessary. Suppose by contradiction that (6) does not hold. Then for
each x ∈ SV = {0, 1}V with d (x, (0, 0, . . . , 0)) = 1 we have that for each t ∈ N0
(12) ϕ(t+ 1, t, x) 6= (0, 0, . . . , 0).
If (0, 0, . . . , 0) is an attractor then there exists t ∈ N such that
ϕ(t, 0, x) 6= (0, 0, . . . , 0) and ϕ(t+ 1, 0, x) = (0, 0, . . . , 0),
which implies that
ϕ(t+ 1, t, x) = (0, 0, . . . , 0),
a contradiction to (12). 
Obviously, if the update order is not non-omitting, the single cooperator need not have
a chance to switch and therefore there are no conditions which ensure attractivity of
(0, 0, . . . , 0) or (1, 1, . . . , 1). In the following example we show that for general non-omitting
update orders, we cannot reverse the implications, since either (6) or (7) need not be nec-
essary.
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Example 25. Let us consider a nonautonomous evolutionary game on Kn with utility
function (4) and with non-omitting and periodic update order given by (10) in Example
16. Let us assume that (a, b, c, d) ∈ P are such that (6) is not satisfied, i.e.
(13) (n− 1)b > c+ (n− 2)d,
but
a+ (n− 2)b < 2c+ (n− 3)d,(14)
2a+ (n− 3)b < 3c+ (n− 4)d.(15)
Condition (13) implies that one cooperator has a higher utility than (n − 1) defectors,
inequalities (14) and (15) ensure that two (or three) cooperators have lower utility than
(n− 2) (or (n− 3)) defectors.
If x ∈ SV = {0, 1}V is such that d (x, (0, 0, . . . , 0)) = 1 (i.e. there exists a unique i ∈ V
such that xi = 1), then we have two possibilities
• i ∈ {1, 2}. Since i ∈ T (0), we have that
ϕ(1, 0, x)
(13)
= (1, 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0),
ϕ(2, 0, x)
(14)
= (1, 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0),
ϕ(3, 0, x)
(14)
= (0, 0, 0, 0, . . . , 0).
• i ∈ {3, 4, . . . , n}. Then without loss of generality, we can assume that i = 3. Hence,
ϕ(1, 0, x)
(13)
= (1, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0),
ϕ(2, 0, x)
(15)
= (1, 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0),
ϕ(3, 0, x)
(14)
= (0, 0, 0, 0, . . . , 0).
Consequently, we have shown that (0, 0, . . . , 0) is an attractor although (6) is not satisfied.
7. Existence of Attractors and Update Orders
In the previous sections we have seen that (6) and (7) are necessary and sufficient for
the existence of the attractors (0, 0, . . . , 0) and (1, 1, . . . , 1) on Kn if the synchronous or
sequential update order is considered. In this section we focus on the difference between
synchronous and sequential update orders in situations in which those inequalities are not
satisfied. We show that the behaviour is no longer identical and that sequential updating
offers a more diverse behaviour.
First we study the synchronous update order.
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Theorem 26. Let (a, b, c, d) ∈ P. Let us consider the (autonomous) evolutionary game
ϕ on Kn with the utility function (4). Then there exists a nontrivial attractor of ϕ if and
only if either (6) or (7) hold.
Proof. Obviously, if (6) or (7) hold, then either (0, 0, . . . , 0) or (1, 1, . . . , 1) are attractors,
see Theorems 9 and 10.
Now, let us assume that neither (6) nor (7) hold. Let x ∈ SV and m = ∑ni=1 xi. If we
denote by v1(m) (v0(m)) the utilities of vertices with xi = 1 (xi = 0), we can easily derive
that
v1(m)− v0(m) = (m− 1)a+ (n−m)b−mc− (n−m− 1)d
= −m((c− a) + (b− d)) + n(b− d)− (a− d).(16)
The simultaneous violation of (6) and (7) implies that v1(1) − v0(1) ≥ 0 and v1(n −
1) − v0(n − 1) ≤ 0. Then (16) implies that (c − a) + (b − d) > 0 and that there exists
m∗ ∈ [1, n− 1] defined by
(17) m∗ :=
n(b− d)− (a− d)
(c− a) + (b− d) ,
such that v1(m
∗)−v0(m∗) = 0. Note that limn→∞ m∗n = d−b(a−c)+(d−b) , i.e. as n tends to infinity
m∗
n
tends to the interior fixed point of the replicator dynamics of HD and SH games (see
Section 3).
We consider three invariant sets {(0, 0, . . . , 0)} and {(1, 1, . . . , 1)} and M∗, which is given
by
M∗ :=
{
x ∈ SV :
n∑
i=1
xi = m
∗
}
,
and is nonempty if and only if m∗ ∈ N. The sign of v1(m)− v0(m) determines that
• ϕi(x) = 1 if m < m∗,
• ϕi(x) = 0 if m > m∗,
• ϕi(x) = xi if m = m∗.
Therefore, the basins of attraction of these three invariant sets are given by
B ({(0, 0, . . . , 0)}) = {(0, 0, . . . , 0)} ∪
{
x ∈ SV : m∗ <
n∑
i=1
xi < n
}
,
B ({(1, 1, . . . , 1)}) = {(1, 1, . . . , 1)} ∪
{
x ∈ SV : 0 <
n∑
i=1
xi < m
∗
}
,
B (M∗) = M∗.
Consequently, none of these invariant sets is an attractor (see Remark 22) and there is only
the trivial attractor SV . 
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The fact that M∗ is not attractive may look surprising. The proof shows that this is caused
by the synchronous update order which implies that all vertices update to full cooperation
or full defection. Next we provide a characterization of the existence of an attractor for
the sequential update order as well.
Theorem 27. Let (a, b, c, d) ∈ P. Let us consider a nonautonomous evolutionary game
ϕ on Kn with the utility function (4) and sequential update order. Then there exists a
nontrivial attractor if and only if (a, b, c, d) satisfy either
(a) inequality (6), or
(b) inequality (7), or
(c) m∗ ∈ [2, n− 2] and c− a+ b− d > 0.
Proof. Using the notation of the proof of Theorem 26 we observe that there exists α, β ∈ R
such that
(18) v1(m)− v0(m) = αm+ β.
Hence, we can distinguish between five cases. Either
(i) v1(1)− v0(1) < 0, or
(ii) v1(1)− v0(1) ≥ 0 and v1(2)− v0(2) < 0, or
(iii) v1(2)− v0(2) ≥ 0 and v1(n− 2)− v0(n− 2) ≤ 0, or
(iv) v1(n− 2)− v0(n− 2) > 0 and v1(n− 1)− v0(n− 1) ≤ 0, or
(v) v1(n− 1)− v0(n− 1) > 0.
First, we can observe that (i) is satisfied if and only if (6) holds. Then Theorem 24 implies
that (0, 0, . . . , 0) is attractive. Similarly, (v) is satisfied if and only if (7) holds and Theorem
24 yields that (1, 1, . . . , 1) is attractive.
In the remaining three cases (ii)-(iv), the equalities (18) and (16) imply that c−a+b−d > 0,
i.e. that there exists m∗ ∈ [−1, n− 1] given by (17) which satisfies v1(m∗)− v0(m∗) = 0.
Let us consider case (iii) first. The inequalities (iii) imply that m∗ ∈ [2, n − 2] and c −
a + b − d > 0. As in the proof of Theorem 26 we see immediately that v1(m) > v0(m) if
and only if 0 < m < m∗ and that v0(m) > v1(m) if and only if m∗ < m < n. Moreover,
sequential update order implies that for all t ∈ N0 we have T (t) = {i} for some i ∈ V .
This implies that
• if 0 < m < m∗, ϕi(t+ 1, t, x) = 1,
• if m∗ < m < n, ϕi(t+ 1, t, x) = 0,
• if m = m∗, ϕi(t+ 1, t, x) = xi.
Consequently, we distinguish between two cases
(a) if m∗ ∈ N. First, we consider x ∈ SV such that 1 ≤
n∑
i=1
xi = m < m
∗. Without loss of
generality we can assume that the vertices are numbered so that x1 = · · · = xm = 0.
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Define
(19) A :=
{
(t, x) ∈ N0 × SV :
n∑
i=1
xi = m
∗
}
.
Then
ϕi(i, 0, x) = 1,
and thus there exists x∗ ∈ A (i.e. ∑ni=1 x∗i = m∗) so that
ϕ(t, 0, x) = x∗, for all t ≥ m.
Similarly, if x is such that m∗ <
∑n
i=1 xi = m ≤ n− 1, then the first (m−m∗) vertices
i with xi = 1 switch to xi = 0. Consequently, the set A is the attractor of ϕ.
(b) if m∗ /∈ N, one could repeat the argument to get that any initial condition reaches a
state with
∑n
i=1 xi = bm∗c. If we are at such a state x in time t and T (t) = {i} we
have that
ϕi(t+ 1, t, x) = 1,
independently of xi at time t. This implies that either x remains unchanged or a state
with
∑n
i=1 xi = dm∗e is reached.
Similarly, if we are at a state x with
∑n
i=1 xi = dm∗e we have ϕi(t+ 1, t, x) = 0, and
either x remains unchanged or a state with
∑n
i=1 xi = bm∗c is reached.
Consequently, we observe that the set
(20) A =
{
(t, x) ∈ N0 × SV :
n∑
i=1
xi = bm∗c or
n∑
i=1
xi = dm∗e
}
is an attractor. The fact that the dynamical system always switches from a state with∑n
i=1 xi = bm∗c to a state with
∑n
i=1 xi = dm∗e and the finiteness of the graph implies
that A is a union of cycles.
To finish the proof, we consider cases (ii) and (iv), i.e. the situation in which m∗ ∈ [1, 2)∪
(n−2, n−1] and c−a+b−d > 0. In this case, the sets given by (19) and (20) are invariant by
the same argument as above. However, they are not attractive, since (0, 0, . . . , 0) /∈ B(A)
if m∗ ∈ [1, 2) and (1, 1, . . . , 1) /∈ B(A) if m∗ ∈ (n− 2, n− 1]. 
Remark 28. To sum up, Theorems 26 and 27 provide a complete characterization of
attractors of evolutionary games on Kn with either synchronous or sequential update order.
For synchronous update order, there are four possible outcomes:
• only (0, 0, . . . , 0) is attractive,
• only (1, 1, . . . , 1) is attractive,
• both (0, 0, . . . , 0) and (1, 1, . . . , 1) are attractive,
• there is no nontrivial attractor.
These four regions correspond to those depicted in Figure 2.
For sequential update order we have another two possibilities which consist of states in
which both cooperators and defectors exist together:
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Figure 4. Illustration of Theorem 27 with a = 1 and d = 0. Both
(0, 0, . . . , 0) and (1, 1, . . . , 1) are attractive in the horizontally hatched region,
(0, 0, . . . , 0) in the light gray region, (1, 1, . . . , 1) in the dark gray region. In
the vertically hatched region, the attractive cycles (20) and attractors (19)
occur. There are no nontrivial attractors in the two dotted regions.
• there is an attractive cycle given by (20),
• there is an attractive set of invariant states given by (19).
Analyzing the above results, we see that the attracting cycle and the attracting set in
which both cooperators and defectors exist together can occur if and only if (a, b, c, d) ∈
PHD ∪ PFC . PFC is the only region in which all possible scenarios coexist, see Figure 4.
Again, note that Theorems 26 and 27 are consistent with the standard evolutionary game
theory [13] as n → ∞. Note that both the bistability region (both (0, 0, . . . , 0) and
(1, 1, . . . , 1) are attractive) and the stable coexistence region in the sequential updating
converge to PSH and PHD, respectively. Note that, in finite populations, they are smaller
but overreach to PFC as well, see Figure 4.
We provide a simple example to better illustrate the cycle of length n(n + 1) which has
been constructed in the proof of Theorem 27.
Example 29. Let us assume that (a, b, c, d) ∈ PHD ∪ PFC and m∗ ∈ [2, n − 2] is such
that m∗ /∈ N. Let us consider an evolutionary game on Kn with utility function (4) and
sequential update order. We consider the initial condition:
x = (
bm∗c︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, 1, . . . 1,
n−bm∗c︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, 0, . . . , 0).
20 JEREMIAS EPPERLEIN, STEFAN SIEGMUND, AND PETR STEHLI´K
Consequently, we derive that (bold numbers indicate the vertex which has just been up-
dated)
ϕ(1, 0, x) = (1, 1, . . . 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0),
ϕ(2, 0, x) = (1,1, . . . 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0),
. . .
ϕ(bm∗c, 0, x) = (1, 1, . . .1, 0, 0, . . . , 0),
ϕ(bm∗c+ 1, 0, x) = (1, 1, . . . 1,1, 0, . . . , 0),
ϕ(bm∗c+ 2, 0, x) = (1, 1, . . . 1, 1,0, . . . , 0),
. . .
ϕ(n, 0, x) = (1, 1, . . . 1, 1, 0, . . . ,0),
ϕ(n+ 1, 0, x) = (0, 1, . . . 1, 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
bm∗c
, 0, . . . , 0).
We repeat this argument to get that
ϕ(2(n+ 1), 0, x) = (0,0, 1, . . . 1, 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
bm∗c
, 0, . . . , 0),
. . .
ϕ(p(n+ 1), 0, x) = (0, 0, . . .0︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
, 1, . . . 1, 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
bm∗c
, 0, . . . , 0),
. . .
ϕ(n(n+ 1), 0, x) = (1, 1, . . . 1, 0, 0, . . . ,0).
8. Irregular Graphs - Role of Utility Functions
In this section we study simple irregular graphs – wheels Wl, l ≥ 4, in which a central
vertex is connected to all vertices of an (l − 1)-cycle, see Figure 5. Our focus lies on
identifying the importance of different forms of utility functions, e.g. (4), (5) or others.
Evolutionary games on regular graphs, which we have considered exclusively so far, are
the same for aggregate uAi and mean u
M
i utility functions (see (4)-(5)), since u
A
i is just a
multiple of uMi in this case. Straightforwardly, this is not longer true for irregular graphs.
First, we study the attractivity of (1, 1, . . . , 1).
Theorem 30. Let (a, b, c, d) ∈ P. Let us consider an evolutionary game ϕ on Wl. Then
(1, 1, . . . , 1) is an attractor if and only if
(21)
{
c < 2a+b
l−1 if u
A
i is considered,
c < 2a+b
3
if uMi is considered.
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Figure 5. Wheels W8 and W14.
Proof. Let us number the vertices, so that the central vertex 1 is connected to peripheral
vertices {2, 3, . . . , n}.
(1) Let us consider the aggregate utility uAi first and suppose again that the state
x ∈ SV is such that ∑ni=1 xi = n− 1.
(a) If the central vertex is the single defector, then
uA1 = (l − 1)c,
uAi = 2a+ b, i = 2, 3, . . . , n.
Obviously, the first inequality in (21) is equivalent to uA1 < u
A
i .
(b) If the single defector is a peripheral vertex, we can, without loss of generality,
assume that x = (1, 0, 1, . . . , 1), i.e. vertex 2 is the single defector. Then, we
have that
uA1 = (l − 2)a+ b,
uA2 = 3c,
uAi = 2a+ b, i ∈ N1(2) ∩ {2, 3, . . . , n},
uAi = 3a, i /∈ N1(2).
Then we can bound uA2 by u
A
1 from above
uA2 = 3c
(21)
< 3
2a+ b
l − 1
(A5)
≤ 3(l − 2)a+ b
3
= uA1 .
Consequently ϕ(x) = (1, 1, . . . , 1).
(2) If the mean utility uMi is considered instead then
(a) If the central vertex is the single defector, we have
uM1 = c,
uMi =
2a+ b
3
, i = 2, 3, . . . , n.
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The latter inequality in (21) is equivalent to uM1 < u
M
i .
(b) If the single defector is a peripheral vertex, we can again, without loss of
generality, assume that x = (1, 0, 1, . . . , 1). Then, the utilities have the form
uM1 =
(l − 2)a+ b
l − 1 ,
uM2 = c,
uMi =
2a+ b
3
, i ∈ N1(2) ∩ {2, 3, . . . , n},
uMj = a, j /∈ N1(2),
which immediately implies that uM2 < u
M
i , for all i ∈ N1(2).
Paragraphs 1(a) and 2(a) show that both inequalities in (21) are also necessary. If they are
violated, then either ϕ(x) = x (if equalities hold) or ϕi(x) = 0 for all i (if reverse inequalities
hold), i.e., all vertices switch to defection and (1, 1, . . . , 1) cannot be attained. 
We can make a few straightforward observations.
Remark 31. The proof could be repeated for nonautonomous evolutionary games with
sequential update order.
Note that, (A5) was used in the proof. If we do not assume that (A5) holds, i.e. a could
be non-positive, then the condition for the aggregate utility would be
c < min
{
2a+ b
l − 1 ,max
{
2a+ b
3
,
(l − 2)a+ b
3
}}
.
In (21) the former inequality implies the latter. The aggregate utility function favours
the vertex with higher degree, whereas the mean utility function eliminates differences
resulting from different degrees. More importantly, if we consider the mean utility function
the necessary and sufficient condition is independent of the wheel size l, whereas with the
aggregate utility, the inequality is satisfied only for small wheels. Indeed, we can rewrite
the inequality as l < 1 + 2a+b
c
.
Note that the inequalities in (21) can be satisfied if and only if c < a, i.e. (a, b, c, d) ∈
PSH ∩ PFC .
We can simply formulate a similar result for full defection (0, 0, . . . , 0).
Theorem 32. Let (a, b, c, d) ∈ P. Let us consider an evolutionary game ϕ on Wl. Then
(0, 0, . . . , 0) is an attractor if and only if
(22)
{
a < 2d+c
l−1 if u
A
i is considered,
a < 2d+c
3
if uMi is considered.
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9. Open questions
In this paper we define evolutionary games on graphs rigorously as dynamical systems and
also state several results on the existence of attractors, their basins of attraction and their
relationship to update orders and regularity. Our results lead to many open questions, we
list those which we find most interesting to consider as a next step towards the development
of a theory of evolutionary games:
(A) Mixed fixed points: Find sufficient conditions on the graph and admissible pa-
rameters (a, b, c, d) ∈ P which ensure existence/nonexistence of mixed fixed points
x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n), in which cooperators x
∗
i = 1 and defectors x
∗
j = 0 coexist for some
i 6= j.
(B) Attractors: Construct efficient methods for finding all attractors for a given graph
and admissible parameters (a, b, c, d) ∈ P .
(C) Maximal number of fixed points: Find the maximal number of fixed points for
all connected graphs with n vertices.
(D) Realization of mixed fixed points: Determine all admissible parameters (a, b, c, d) ∈
P for which there exists an evolutionary game on a connected graph with a mixed
fixed point.
(E) Existence of cycles: Determine all admissible parameters (a, b, c, d) ∈ P for which
there exists (or does not exist) a cycle (of length at least 2) of an evolutionary game
with sequential/synchronous update orders.
(F) Maximal cycle: Find the maximal length of a cycle of an evolutionary game on an
arbitrary graph with n vertices.
(G) Graph properties and evolutionary games: Relate graph features (size, regular-
ity, diameter/girth, connectivity, clique number etc.) to the properties of evolutionary
games on these graphs (existence of attractors, fixed points, cycles, ...).
(H) Different dynamics: In this paper we used imitation dynamics (1). Describe major
differences in the case that different deterministic dynamics are used (e.g. birth-death,
death-birth, see Remark 4).
(I) Utility functions: In Section 8 we showed that the aggregate utility function (4)
favours vertices with higher degree. Describe this phenomenon precisely and ana-
lyze the role of other utility functions. See [20] for the discussion on averaging and
accumulation of utility functions in stochastic evolutionary games.
(J) Non-omitting update orders: Theorem 24 and Example 25 show that conditions
(6) and (7) are only sufficient for attractivity of (0, 0, . . . , 0) and (1, 1, . . . , 1). Find
necessary and sufficient conditions for any non-omitting update order.
(K) Regular graphs: Example 13 showed that (8) and (9) are only sufficient but not
necessary for attractivity of (0, 0, . . . , 0) and (1, 1, . . . , 1). Construct similar coun-
terexamples for arbitrary k. Find a necessary and sufficient condition for attractivity
of (0, 0, . . . , 0) and (1, 1, . . . , 1) on k-regular graphs.
(L) Irregular graphs: Identify features of irregular graphs that play an essential role in
the dynamics of evolutionary games on them.
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